Friday, February 7, 2014

Cyprus: Perhaps the last chance to end the division

The Nicosia buffer zone. A wound in the midst of Cyprus
Saying that the story of Cyprus is a story of missed opportunities may be a cliché but could not be truer today. 

The rejection of the Annan plan by the Greek-Cypriot electorate back in  2004 undoubtedly damaged the cause of the reunification of the island. The election of Dimitris Christofias to the presidency of the republic in 2008 came too late as Mehmet Ali Talat was facing elections two years later. Both leaders had to face internal challenges. For a start, mending the wounds that the bitter 'anti Annan plan' campaign in the south had inflicted upon the cause of a united Cyprus required time and determination, both of which were in short supply. Talat had to counter the criticisms of an ascendant pro-independence National Unity Party and its leader Derviş Eroğlu who by 2009 was cohabiting with him as prime minister and in 2010 moved to the presidency of the TRNC. Christofias, despite his pro-reunification reflexes, had co-presided over a vehement 'no' campaign during the Papadopoulos years that had badly bruised the forces that could support his rapprochement initiative. He decided to tread carefully and slowly against accusations of recklessness and did not manage to make up the lost ground during his negotiations with Talat. Once Eroğlu succeded him, Christofias realized there was no point in pursuing talks that would leave him vulnerable in the republic and might cost him his reelection prospects - a reelection that at the end of the day slipped away from his grasp as he had to withdraw in the midst of a public outcry over scandals and corruption. By 2012 most commentators had declared the process that had effectively stalled at least a year earlier a failure with the UN Secretary General's special envoy, Alexander Downer, washing his hands
   
As a divorce seemed to be the most likely outcome by the end of 2013, Turkey's foreign minister met in Athens with his Greek counterpart to discuss Cyprus just before visiting Northern Cyprus for talks with the Turkish Cypriot leadership. The reasons were many: An embattled Turkish government facing corruption accusations just as it had thought it had put behind it the early summer urban protests needed the boost of opening a new chapter in its EU accession negotiations which have implicitly been linked with Turkey's constructive role in the Cyprus issue. The US concurred that such a development would restore the credibility of the AKP government and would contribute to regional stability at a very tense time. And, of course, the new president of the republic had been elected on a pro-unification ticket.

Although the public statements Davutoğlu and Turkish Cypriot officials made during his Cyprus visit suggested that the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot positions were entrenched, seasoned observers could read between the lines; it was obvious that Turkey was pushing for more flexibility on the part of the Turkish Cypriots. 

In the South, president Anastasiades has been trying to overcome the intransigence of opponents of any rapprochement with the North who are still influential in Greek Cypriot politics - including his party's government partners ΔΗΚΟ, especially at a time when domestic economic problems have been at the top of the challenges his administration was facing. In addition, aware of the obstructionist tactics of his potential interlocutor were the intercommunal negotiations to resume, Anastasiades echoed Ban Ki-moon's 2011 reservations and insisted that there was no point to resume dialogue for the sake of dialogue and demanded that the two sides agree on a joint communiqué that set the rules of the game. Although for many this was seen as an unnecessary technicality, it is a significant prerequisite for a process that is running out of steam. The international community is experiencing fatigue and might look for alternative solutions should this round of negotiations meets an impasse. Syria just over 100km to the east has been attracting more attention and is likely to be the focal point of international diplomacy as the conflict unfolds and the humanitarian crisis deepens. A further failure after the Annan plan rejection and the inconclusive Christofias-Talat/Eroğlu process would send the unambiguous message that the parties to the process do not have faith in the prospect of a common future. It seems that the disputed communiqué (leaked below) will be agreed on as the shuttle diplomacy of the UN and US and the tacit support of Turkey indicate. Agreeing on it may well be the last chance Cyprus has. I hope the leaders will rise to the circumstances and will take it.

Draft communiqué  

1. The status quo is unacceptable and its prolongation will have negative consequences for the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. The leaders affirmed that a settlement would have a positive impact on the entire region, while first and foremost benefiting Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, respecting democratic principles, human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as each other’s distinct identity and integrity and ensuring their common future in a united Cyprus within the European Union.

2. The leaders expressed their determination to resume structured negotiations in a results-oriented manner. All unresolved core issues will be on the table and will be discussed interdependently. The leaders will aim to reach a settlement as soon as possible and hold separate simultaneous referenda thereafter.

3. The settlement will be based on a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation with political equality as set out in the relevant Security Council Resolutions and the High Level Agreements. The united Cyprus, as a member of the United Nations and of the European Union, shall have a single, international legal personality and a single sovereignty which is defined as the sovereignty which is enjoyed by all members States of the United Nations, under the UN Charter and which emanates equally from Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. There will be a single united Cyprus citizenship, regulated by federal law. All citizens of the United Cyprus shall also be citizens of either the Greek-Cypriot constituent state or the Turkish-Cypriot constituent state. This status shall be internal and shall complement and not substitute in any way the united Cyprus citizenship.
The powers of the federal government and like matters that are clearly incidental to its specified powers, will be assigned by the constitution. The Federal constitution will also provide for the residual powers to be exercised by the constituent states. The constituent states will exercise fully and irrevocably all their powers free from encroachment by the federal government. The federal laws will not encroach upon constituent state laws within the constituent states’ area of competences and the constituent states’ laws will not encroach upon the federal laws within the federal government’s competences. Any dispute in respect thereof will be adjudicated finally by the Federal Supreme Court. Neither side may claim authority or jurisdiction over the other.

4. The united Cyprus federation shall result from the settlement following the settlement’s approval by separate simultaneous referenda. The Federal constitution shall prescribe that the united Cyprus federation shall be composed of two constituent states of equal status. The bi-zonal, bi-communal nature of the federation and the principles upon which the EU is founded will be safeguarded and respected throughout the island. The Federal constitution shall be the supreme law of the land and will be binding on all the federation’s authorities and on the constituent states. Union in whole or in part with any other country or any form of partition or secession or any other unilateral change to the state of affairs will be prohibited.

5. The negotiations are based on the principle that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.

6. The appointed representatives are fully empowered to discuss any issue at any time and should enjoy parallel access to all stakeholders and interested parties in the process, as needed. The leaders of the two communities will meet as often as needed. They retain the ultimate decision-making power. Only an agreement freely reached by the leaders may be put to separate simultaneous referenda. Any kind of arbitration is excluded.

7. The sides will seek to create a positive atmosphere to ensure the talks succeed. They commit to avoiding blame games or other negative public comments on the negotiations. They also commit to efforts to implement confidence building measures that will provide dynamic impetus to the prospect for a united Cyprus.

Wednesday, February 5, 2014

The Name Issue Revisited: an examination of the Greek-Macedonian dispute

The Name Issue Revisited, an Anthology of Academic Articles is finally now out.

Part I: The Name Issue in the Context of International Law
Matthew CR Craven – What’s in a Name? The Republic of Macedonia and Issues of Statehood............................................................................... 17
Jean-Pierre Queneudec – The Name and Symbols of the State in International Law....................................................................................55
Larry Reimer – Macedonia: Cultural Right or Cultural Appropriation?..................... 61
Carlos Flores Juberías – Putting the Name Issue in a Comparative Perspective ..........79
Jana Lozanoska – The True Substance of the Name Issue: Consequences of an Invented Dispute for the Republic of Macedonia...............................95
Budislav Vukas – The 1995 Interim Accord and Membership of the Republic of Macedonia in International Organizations............................. 113
Ernest Petrič – “Legal Validity” of the ICJ Advisory Opinions ................................ 119
Sašo Georgievski – Normative Power Role of the European Union in the Settlement of the Difference Over the Name? A Macedonian View..................................................................................129
Part II: The Name Issue in Political Context
Richard Caplan – The European Community’s Recognition of New States in Yugoslavia .......................................................................... 155
John Shea – The Greek Dispute With the New Republic of Macedonia – to 1995..............................................................169
Biljana Vankovska – David vs. Goliath: The Macedonian Position(s) in the So-Called “Name Dispute”.............................................................. 195
Spyros A. Sofos – Beyond the Intractability of the Greek-Macedonian Dispute ........223
Part III: Identity, Origin and Language—Deconstructing the Myths Surrounding the Name Issue
Victor A. Friedman – The So-Called Macedonian Name Issue in the Context of Modern Macedonian Historiography, Language, and Identity.............239
Loring M. Danforth – The Scholar and the State: Evangelos Kofos on the International Recognition of the Republic of Macedonia .........................253
George Vlahov, Vasko Nastevski and Chris Popov – A Survey of the ‘Macedonian
Question’: The Greek State’s Campaign to Prevent International Recognition of the Republic of Macedonia and Greece’s Refusal to Recognize the Macedonian Minority in Greece....................................267
Katerina Kolozova – Living Beyond Identity?...........................................................305
Akis Gavriilidis – Name Trouble: A Refusal “Especially Difficult to Understand”—and Its Inevitable Failure................................................... 313
Part IV: The Name Issue in Historical Context
Mitko B. Panov – Real and Created Perceptions of Macedonia and the Macedonians in Byzantine Sources from the 4th to the 11th Century: Reconstruction and Deconstruction .........................................................343
Dalibor Jovanovski – Science and Politics—The Creation and Promotion of the Northern Line of the Greek Aspirations in Ottoman Macedonia ............................................................................. 371
Andrew Rossos – Incompatible Allies: Greek Communism and Macedonian Nationalism in the Civil War in Greece, 1943-1949.................................389
Todor Cepreganov – The Great Powers and the Macedonian National Issue During World War II........................................................ 419
Todor Cepreganov and Liljana Panovska – The Civil War in Greece (1946-1949): One Event in History—One Lesson for the Future..................................435
Dimitar Ljorovski Vamvakovski – The Naming of Macedonians by the Greek State (1946-1949): Options and Dilemmas....................................443
Dimitris Lithoksou – ‘The Skopjan Enemy’................................................................ 455
Part V: Testimonials
Zhelyu Zhelev – Once Again on the Recognition of Macedonia and the Name Dispute.....................................................................................463

Robin O’Neill – Macedonia and the European Community: 1992............................ 479
Takis Michas – Plans for Macedonia.........................................................................497



Copies of the volume can be obtained from the the publishers: contact@micnews.com.mk or

Macedonian Information Centre
Naum Naumovski Borce 73,
1000 Skopje
Republic of Macedonia

Tel./Fax:
+389 2 3117 876
+389 2 3117 834
+389 2 3221 842

Monday, February 3, 2014

Post-yugoslav hell

On 31 January the BBC News website focused on a fresco in the Church of the Resurrection in Podgorica that depicted hell. Within a vivid red inferno and in the company of biblical figures that have been condemned to burn in hell, one can see figures bearing a resemblance to an ageless Josip Broz Tito (or Michael Caine cast to impersonate him), Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels and, behind them barely discernible, Lenin and Stalin. The anonymous artist assumed that propagating and 'implementing' communism was a deadly sin but carefully steered away from any similar judgments as far as the opportunistic nationalism that traumatized the societies of former Yugoslavia are concerned. So no Milosevic, Bulatovic, Karadzic or Mladic are discernible in the political hell featured in the walls of the Church of the Resurrection, perhaps while the verdicts on their genocide indictments are pending ...
   



A church in Montenegro has sparked controversy by displaying a fresco depicting Yugoslav communist leader Josip Broz Tito in the fires of hell with Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels.

The newly built Church of Resurrection in the capital Podgorica has already drawn criticism for its lavish design.

Critics now say the church should not be interfering in politics.

Works by philosophers Marx and Engels were required reading when Montenegro was part of communist Yugoslavia.

One church leader, named only as Dragan, told the Agence France-Presse news agency that Marx, Engels and Tito "personify communist evil in the Balkans" and the artist should be "allowed the freedom to see things as he wishes".

However, he added: "He cannot judge, in the name of the Church, who belongs in hell or heaven."
 You can read the entire BBC story here