southeastern europe

The Nicosia buffer zone. A wound in the midst of Cyprus Saying that the story of Cyprus is a story of missed opportunities may be a clich é but could not be truer today.  The rejection of the Annan plan by the Greek-Cypriot electorate back in  2004 undoubtedly damaged the cause of the reunification of the island. The election of Dimitris Christofias to the presidency of the republic in 2008 came too late as Mehmet Ali Talat was facing elections two years later. Both leaders had to face internal challenges. For a start, mending the wounds that the bitter 'anti Annan plan' campaign in the south had inflicted upon the cause of a united Cyprus required time and determination, both of which were in short supply. Talat had to counter the criticisms of an ascendant pro-independence  National Unity Party  and its leader Derviş Eroğlu who by 2009 was cohabiting with him as prime minister and in 2010 moved to the presidency of the TRNC. Christofias, despite his pro-reunification

Serbia and Kosovo have concluded their own version of an interim agreement today. Although the fate of the Greek-Macedonian Interim agreement suggests we should be cautious in our assessment of what has been achieved today, this EU-brokered rapprochement, despite its provisional character and vagueness, represents a very positive step, albeit short of full recognition. Not for Greece though, as its ambitious agenda 2014 of a forward looking Greece in a forward looking Southeastern Europe is a faint mirage of what could have been. Instead, Greece is probably the only country that continues to follow the previous Serbian policy of non recognition of Kosovo. It is probably a symptom of a chronic affliction, of dwelling in a past forever gone. It reminds me of the Greek Communist Party's inability to realize it inhabits a world that has left Stalin's Soviet Union behind at a time that those who lived through it have long moved on. 

The politica l system of the Republic of Cyprus, even after the de facto partition of the island after the invasion of the Turkish armed forces back in the summer of 1974 is a system built on deliberation and compromise. Presidential elections are an intricate affair that can often lead to unlikely bedfellows sharing between them the key political positions of the small state and the power these entail. The likelihood of gaining positions of influence in the state apparatuses, as well as personal rivalries are usually important factors in determining the composition and shape of alliances, especially in the second round of the presidential poll. These are often shortsighted attempts to gain advantages that maintain and reproduce a clientelistic system and perpetuate the "relevance" of political parties that would have otherwise become obsolete. In such a context, the notions of   Left ,   Centre  and   Right  are not able to convey recognizable messages to the unsuspecting

Folgen der Finanzkrise für Griechenland  Die Mauern der Bürokratie müssen fallen   08.10.2011 " Greece is smothered by its bureaucracy. Corruption and nepotism have raised a destructive wall in the midst of the country. Many young people do not have a chance. If this system is not demolished, Greece cannot be saved". Folgen der Finanzkrise für Griechenland  Das alte Land kämpft gegen den Untergang 08.10.2011 "the old Greece is fighting to survive". Excellent analysis of the social and political dynamics unleashed, or rather, revealed by the crisis. Orthodox church appears to be exempt from austerity measures 04.10.2011   Church funds are taboo in Greece. Its income is liable to taxation, but there are two major stumbling blocks. There is no accounting system to detail its actual income and no one really knows quite how much land it owns because there is no land register. This situation suits both the church and the state, "because politicians ar

ANOTHER EUROPEAN DEFICIT: IS THERE RESPONSIBLE SCHOLARSHIP? by Biljana Vankovska A spectre has been haunting the intellectual circles in the region of former Yugoslavia for years. It’s probably more appropriate to talk about a haunting fear of being seen as a follower of any of the nationalistic policies that ended in a Balkan tragedy. Even the new generations of scholars and intellectuals bear the scars of the “original sin” of their older colleagues, i.e. their passive stand or even active support of nationalistic leaders from the end of 20 century. The (un)conscious feeling of responsibility and guilt for the bloody Yugoslav turmoil is being constantly mixed with the fear of possible stigmatization as a “nationalist”. Milosevic’s or Tudjman’s ghosts are hanging as a Damocles’ sword over anybody who dares speak about “national issues”, or, even worse, if s/he dares to pronounce a critical opinion on NATO/EU/USA (especially having in mind that these international actors have