southeastern europe

Until yesterday morning I was arguing that although I did not support the 'no' vote I would support the government in its negotiations. I criticized people who were drawn to the vortex of the polarization the referendum had caused and suggested we all needed to look ahead.  Yet, the government itself arrived in Brussels with no proposals. Alexis Tsipras snubbed the European Parliament before he finally accepted to appear there today. He invited the leaders of the Greek political parties in a conference about the country's next moves and called for national unity while winking at those who at the same time vilified figures who supported the 'yes' campaign. The silence that shrouds the inclusion of the half million of nazis who voted no into the 'progressive' 'people' was in sharp contrast with the wanton and determined campaign to bundle together and brand those who voted 'yes' as collaborators of the Germans (resurrecting terms that were u

published in openDemocracy on 1 July 2015 The announcement of the decision of the prime minister of Greece in the early hours of last Saturday, to hold a referendum on whether Greece should accept the draft agreement of a new debt relief programme or not, took me by surprise.  Having been active in the Eurocommunist Left of the 1980s I was aware that the claims that SYRIZA saw itself as an upholder of that pro-European Left tradition were largely exaggerated, but despite my private doubts on this issue, I did not expect the agenda of the party to include the possibility of an exit from the Eurozone and, more importantly, a profound clash with Greece’s European partners.  So, last Saturday morning, as I was frantically going through news stories about the Greek debt crisis and what appeared to be the collapse of the negotiations between Greece and its creditors I came across various explanations about what had transpired.  Tsipras, some reports said, had been humiliated when

I was in Turkey during Kenan Evren's violent and excessively repressive coup. I was very young and, coming from a neighbouring country that had experienced its own brutal dictatorship, I was shocked by the indiscriminate brutality of the takeover of power. The extreme violence of the coup cannot be justified by the argument, however true, that it gave an end to widespread social unrest and violent conflict.  Indeed, it should not be forgotten that Evren institutionalised state violence, treated human life as expendable, penalized not only actual engagement in the violence that had marked Turkey's urban landscapes, but also what he and his accomplices deemed to be 'subversive thinking'. Turkey's moderate left was decimated as the ire of the regime was directed more towards them than the Right. The military junta allowed and enhanced the use of demeaning practices such as vengeful systematic torture, 'virginity' tests against 'suspect' wome

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The Nicosia buffer zone. A wound in the midst of Cyprus Saying that the story of Cyprus is a story of missed opportunities may be a clich é but could not be truer today.  The rejection of the Annan plan by the Greek-Cypriot electorate back in  2004 undoubtedly damaged the cause of the reunification of the island. The election of Dimitris Christofias to the presidency of the republic in 2008 came too late as Mehmet Ali Talat was facing elections two years later. Both leaders had to face internal challenges. For a start, mending the wounds that the bitter 'anti Annan plan' campaign in the south had inflicted upon the cause of a united Cyprus required time and determination, both of which were in short supply. Talat had to counter the criticisms of an ascendant pro-independence  National Unity Party  and its leader Derviş Eroğlu who by 2009 was cohabiting with him as prime minister and in 2010 moved to the presidency of the TRNC. Christofias, despite his pro-reunification

The Name Issue Revisited, an Anthology of Academic Articles  is finally now out. Part I: The Name Issue in the Context  of International Law Matthew CR Craven – What’s in a Name? The Republic of Macedonia  and Issues of Statehood............................................................................... 17 Jean-Pierre Queneudec – The Name and Symbols of the State  in International Law....................................................................................55 Larry Reimer – Macedonia: Cultural Right or Cultural Appropriation?..................... 61 Carlos Flores Juberías – Putting the Name Issue in a Comparative Perspective ..........79 Jana Lozanoska – The True Substance of the Name Issue: Consequences  of an Invented Dispute for the Republic of Macedonia...............................95 Budislav Vukas – The 1995 Interim Accord and Membership of the  Republic of Macedonia in International Organizations............................. 113 Ernest Petrič – “Legal